## EXHIBIT 5

arguing consciousness of guilt for something you haven't charged him with and that your department writ large has withdrawn.

MR. ARAD: That brings us to the next part, your Honor, consciousness of guilt. Here, the government's view is that the imposition of the OFAC sanctions told the defendant there will now be scrutiny on Tornado Cash at an unprecedented level, and not only with respect to these sanctions but also with respect to Tornado Cash's other conduct.

In the defendant's own statements during the charged time period and those of his co-conspirators show that they knew at the time they were doing something wrong. For example, when the Ronin hack happened, one of the co-conspirators asked, sum and substance, I'd like to ask you some questions about how you go about laundering \$600 million worth of stolen crypto. That doesn't have anything to do with the OFAC sanctions, except once the OFAC sanctions came down, these co-conspirators who knew they had been doing wrong now knew that people were watching.

And so the consciousness of guilt is not about their guilt with respect to the new OFAC sanctions. It's about their guilt with respect to the charged offenses. Now, the government would also, your Honor --

THE COURT: But, sir, understand, and I'm not saying I'm going to do this, if that comes in, the withdrawal of the

found both in the extraction itself and on the Graykey report of the extraction.

THE COURT: Did he receive the totality of the Graykey report while in the Netherlands from which he then himself took subsets of the Graykey report, or did he take -- did he take the Graykey report, duplicate it in its entirety, and bring it back here?

MR. ARAD: He received a copy of the Graykey report, which is just a two-page document, your Honor, that, as I said earlier, operates almost like a receipt, contains identifying information about the device, and some information about, for example, when it was extracted.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. ARAD: Separate and apart from that, there is the extraction itself.

THE COURT: Yes. Did he receive a copy of the full extraction or some subset of it?

MR. ARAD: He received a subset of the extraction, but I shouldn't say received. He took an extraction of the subset himself, because he personally searched for information within the entire extraction and pulled out what he wanted to bring back to the United States.

THE COURT: You've mentioned to me that the Graykey is a receipt, but he -- could he himself have generated his own Graykey report of that phone?

MR. ARAD: I don't know whether that would have been possible. That's something I could ask him.

THE COURT: He didn't make a copy -- I received a copy of the receipt report, but he didn't himself make that report.

MR. ARAD: The Gray -- he did not himself generate the Graykey report.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. ARAD: But he did generate the reports of evidence that the government seeks to admit at trial here, which were subsets of the extraction.

THE COURT: I understand. He was given access to the extraction from which he then extracted what he believed he needed for this case.

MR. ARAD: Exactly. Now, he did see on the extraction, which he interacted with and observed firsthand, information that allowed him to verify the authenticity of the Graykey report, even though he himself didn't generate the Graykey report. There were a number of pieces of information that allowed him to draw this conclusion, but the main one is there are two different kinds of hash values listed on a Graykey report that should match the hash values on the extraction. And Special Agent Dickerman himself ran an algorithm to check those hashes values and confirm that they did match.

Another example, your Honor, is that the Graykey

report specifies what kind of extraction was taken, and the file name of the extraction itself specifies that same information. In this case, both of them show that an entire extraction of the phone was taken. So it's another way that Special Agent Dickerman knows that the Graykey report is, in fact, an authentic match to the extraction.

THE COURT: Do you believe that neither the Graykey report nor the extraction poses Crawford or Confrontation Clause issues, Bullcoming issues? I'd like to understand that a little more. I suppose for the extraction he can at least say that came from -- I myself extracted from what I understood to be a complete extraction of the Pertsev phone, the stuff that I thought I needed.

MR. ARAD: Yes.

THE COURT: But the Graykey report, might that be testimonial?

MR. ARAD: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Why?

MR. ARAD: The Graykey report contains

machine-generated data. It doesn't contain any analysis or any
recounting of past events done by a human. And the Bullcoming
line of cases simply dealt with facts that were different from
those. In Bullcoming, and Melendez Diaz, and Smith v. Arizona,
the courts were dealing with drug test analyses and blood
alcohol level analyses that were conducted and reported on in

stand alone statements. Therefore, my intern's really awesome research on this subject remains with me, and I'll use it for another day. I know you're appreciative of it.

We now move to authentication of certain records under Rules 902(11), 902(13), and 902(14). I am aware of where things stand. I will wait for the stipulations. What isn't stipulated to, I understand. My initial research, and there is another Judge Liman case on this as well, suggests that the certifications of custodians will suffice. But, again, I can't decide it until I know what's to decide.

The fourth government motion in limine regards the authentication of Mr. Pertsev's cell phone contents and their introduction at trial. This is a long one, so please excuse me.

On the issue of authentication, I'm advised and I was advised today about Agent Dickerman's travels to the Netherlands to obtain portions of the Pertsev phone extraction, which was done via Graykey by Dutch authorities. Excuse me. Let me say that differently. He reviewed the Graykey report. There was an extraction. He took pieces of the extraction. Whether Agent Dickerman can authenticate the Graykey extraction likely depends on whether he can testify that the report cannot have been manipulated.

The government doesn't have the phone. They don't know who created the extraction report, and those do count

against finding that it could be authenticated, but it doesn't exclude the possibility. That is because the Second Circuit has found that Rule 901 does not erect a particularly high hurdle to the admission of evidence. Cases for this proposition: United States v. Balashane, 2024 WL 4586526; and U.S. v. Dinsa, 235 F.3d 645. An item is properly authenticated under Rule 901 if a proponent produces evidence sufficient to support a finding by a reasonable juror that the item is what the proponent claims it is, such as appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics of the item, taken together with all of the circumstances. Evidence can be authenticated in many ways, discussed in cases such as the Balashane case, and United States v. Vayner, 769 F.3d 125 (2014), and United States v. Encarnacion—La Fontaine, 639 F. App'x 710 (2016).

I do believe there is enough here, based upon the representations provided by the government, to authenticate that this data came from Mr. Pertsev's cell phone. There have been chain of custody arguments made to me. Those typically go to the weight and not the admissibility of evidence. One case discussing that is *United States v. Reed*, 650 F. Supp. 3d 182 (2023), citing *United States v. Boot*, 651 F. App'x 62 (2016).

I do find that this case is analogous to and in some respects stronger, though in one respect weaker, than the Jean-Claude case before Judge Gardephe, so I do find that is

and can be authenticated. There is a separate issue with respect to the Confrontation Clause, and I believe, you know, there's a question about whether machine generated forensic data constitutes testimonial hearsay. I am aware of the Smith v. Arizona case. I am aware of Melendez Diaz v. Massachusetts, and of the Bullcoming case, and the Williams case.

It's not clear to me that such a report is testimonial. I think the better way of looking at it is that it's not hearsay, because it is a machine generated record rather than a statement. But to me the machine generated record nature of it takes it from the Confrontation Clause. Whether you look at it from the testimonial side or the statement or hearsay side, it's not violative of the Confrontation Clause. Examples for that, case reports for that includes United States v. El Gammal, 831 F. App'x 539; United States v. Laman (11th Cir. 2008); United States v. Arce, 49 F.4th 382.

So now we have a long list of the admissibility of certain evidence as direct evidence. Defendants profits, admissible. False statements to the financial institution, admissible as direct acts in furtherance of the conspiracy. Efforts to keep Tornado Cash operating post sanction, it is admissible. It is probative of the defendant's intent to facilitate money laundering, the operation of an unlicensed money transmitting business, and to commit continued sanctions